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THE KALAM COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT AND 
THE HYPOTHESIS OF A QUIESCENT UNIVERSE 
William Lane Craig 
Although Stewart Goetz is correct that the kalam cosmological argument does 
not rule out the possibility that the finite temporal series of past events was 
initiated by a distinct personal agent in an eternal, quiescent universe, this 
does not appreciably mitigate the force of the argument for theism. For the 
atheist will hardly be inclined to admit the existence of an eternal, changeless, 
personal Prime Mover rather than the fact that the universe began to exist. 
Moreover, since the existence of a quiescent universe is physically impossi-
ble, it could have existed only by means of a miracle so stupendous that it 
involved the suspension of all the laws of nature. The Prime Mover would 
thus have to be Lord over all the universe, a conclusion which even a suc-
cessful kalam argument for the beginning of the universe does not attain. 
Stewart Goetz's recent, brief critique' of the kalam cosmological argument 
disputes the second premiss of that argument-that the universe began to 
exist-by denying, not that an infinite temporal regress of events is impos-
sible, but that the finitude of the series of past events implies that the uni verse 
had a beginning. He contends that in my defense of the kalam argument2 I 
have failed to refute the hypothesis of a perfectly quiescent universe into 
which change was introduced a finite time ago by a personal agent. 
Although there is, I believe, a substantive objection to the kalam argument 
contained in Goetz's critique, it is unfortunately obscured by his misconstruc-
tion of my argument. Indeed, many of the points which Goetz makes are an 
essential part of my own argument that the temporal first cause of the universe 
is a personal Creator. A re-examination of the original context will reveal 
that most of his objections were anticipated in The Kalam Cosmological 
Argument.3 
The argument takes as given the existence of the material universe and asks 
whether the universe had or had not a beginning. After determining that the 
universe did begin to exist, it asks whether or not that beginning was caused. 
Concluding that the beginning of the universe was caused, the argument 
proceeds to show that that cause was personal rather than impersonal. 
In showing that the universe began to exist, the argument relies upon 
various proofs that an infinite temporal regress of events is impo~sible. This 
would serve to convince most people that the universe began to exist (as Kant 
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assumes in the thesis of his First Antinomy concerning time), but "for the 
sake of completeness" I introduced at this point the hypothesis of the medi-
eval Islamic theologian al-' Allaf that the temporal series of events was pre-
ceded by an eternal, quiescent universe. Against this hypothesis I then 
presented the following disjunctive syllogism: 
1. Either the universe began to exist or the finite temporal regress of events 
was preceded by an eternal, absolutely quiescent universe. 
2. The finite temporal regress of events was not preceded by an eternal, 
absolutely quiescent universe. 
3. Therefore the universe began to exist. 
Goetz apparently agrees with (1), since he does not dispute the impossibility 
of an infinite temporal regress of events. But he denies that (2) has been 
proven because it is possible that a personal agent distinct from the universe 
initiated the temporal series of events by causing a first event in the quiescent 
universe. He then exposits my defense of (2), "in response to this objection."4 
But it should be evident that my defense of (2) is not at all in response to 
this objection. On the contrary, I should agree that what Goetz envisions is 
possible. In fact, I entertained and rejected this hypothesis in the context of 
a process theological view of the universe as the body of God: "To retreat to 
the position that God and the world lay dormant from eternity and began a 
process of mutual development a finite number of years ago completely 
removes any rationale for process theology, since according to this school, 
process and development are essential to God's very nature, and he cannot 
exist without development."5 
Rather my arguments in support of (2) are aimed at an atheistic, materialist 
view of the universe. Hence, all of what Goetz says on p. 101 of his article 
is completely misdirected. On the contrary, the notion of agent causation 
plays an essential role in my later argument that the temporal First Cause of 
the universe must be a personal Creator: 
... while it is true that no mechanical cause existing from eternity could create 
the universe in time, such a production of a temporal effect from an eternal 
cause is possible if and only if the cause is a personal agent who wills from 
eternity to create a temporally finite effect. For while a mechanically operat-
ing set of necessary and sufficient conditions would either produce the effect 
from eternity or not at all, a personal being may freely choose to create at 
any time wholly apart from any distinguishing conditions of one moment 
from another.6 
Of course, one could say that the first effect caused by this personal being is 
not the creation of the universe, but some initial movement in the quiescent 
universe. Creatio ex nihilo would not then be proved, but as I employ it the 
kalam cosmological argument's primary aim is to support theism, not creatio 
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ex nihilo. The price of the quiescent universe hypothesis is admitting the 
existence of an eternal, changeless, uncaused, timeless, immaterial, spaceless, 
personal Prime Mover7 -a hypothesis very suggestive of theism and hardly 
one which the atheist will at this point be prepared to accept! Hence, while 
Goetz is correct that my philosophical argument in behalf of (2) does not 
exclude the possibility that there exists a personal being who initiates the 
temporal series of events into a quiescent universe, that still leaves the atheist 
with a very uncomfortable dilemma: 
4. Either the universe began to exist or the temporal series of events was 
initiated in an eternal, quiescent universe by a transcendent, personal 
being. 
Confronted with such a dilemma, the non-theist may well prefer to accept the 
first horn of the dilemma in the hope that he can stave off the conclusions 
that this beginning was caused or that the cause of the beginning was per-
sonal. 
That dilemma can be made even more uncomfortable by considering my 
second line of defense for (2), which Goetz unfortunately omits altogether, 
namely, that an eternal, quiescent universe is simply physically impossible. 
In The Kalam Cosmological Argument I briefly explain three empirical rea-
sons why such a scenario is physically untenable: (i) Such a universe would 
have to exist at a temperature of absolute zero, which is physically impossi-
ble, (ii) Matter in the early stages of the universe was anything but cold, being 
collapsed into a volatile fireball with temperatures in excess of billions of 
degrees Kelvin, and (iii) In a lump of matter frozen (per impossible) at 
absolute zero, no first event could occur.s To these may be added the quantum 
physical consideration that the quantum mechanical vacuum, which is con-
ceived to underlie all physical reality, far from being quiescent, is a sea of 
continually forming and dissolving particle-antiparticle pairs. Even if we do 
not interpret this picture realistically, it is clear that the quantum mechanical 
vacuum is the scene of intense activity, which has observable consequences 
for atomic structure and concerning which detailed predictions are confirmed 
by experiment to one part in a billion.9 This implies that the physical, space-
time universe is fundamentally and inherently in flux, as Milton K. Munitz 
explains: 
From the point of view of a typical quantum field theory, even the most 
perfect vacuum, as a physical reality, is the scene of intense activity. Accord-
ingly, the term 'vacuum,' in these contexts, has a specially, radically different 
meaning from the one it has in popular usage or in traditional physics. A 
vacuum state is not an absolute void; it is not to be identified with wholly 
empty space. Any quantum field with which a vacuum state is associated may 
be thought of as made up of separate centers of oscillation and excitation .... 
Even in the absence of real particles ... quantum theory allows for the possi-
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bility of the existence of a field and its fluctuations. The quantum mechanical 
vacuum is not quiescent. 1o 
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But what the above implies is that the existence of an eternal, quiescent 
universe is naturally impossible; that is to say, the existence of such a uni-
verse would be quite literally a miracle, indeed, when one reflects on what 
would be involved in such a thing, a miracle of the most stupendous propor-
tions conceivable, since it would involve suspension of all the laws of nature. 
Thus, this alternative to the beginning of the universe involves much more 
than the postulate of a transcendent, personal Prime Mover: it implies the 
existence of a being who is also the sovereign Lord over all the universe and 
its every most minute operation, a startling conclusion to which even the 
kalam cosmological argument does not lead us. The dilemma posed, there-
fore, by the demonstration that the temporal regress of events is not infinite 
is 
5. Either the universe began to exist or the temporal series of events was 
initiated by a transcendent, personal being who miraculously preserved 
the universe from eternity in a quiescent state. 
One might proceed to argue against the latter horn of the dilemma, for ex-
ample, by emphasizing the utterly pointless nature of such an exercise; but 
we may let that pass. For the salient point is that the latter horn of the dilemma 
is as suggestive of theism as the former. 
Goetz's objection, while perhaps precluding a strict demonstration of 
creatio ex nihilo, therefore does little to diminish the force of the kalam 
cosmological argument in support of theism. 
Westmont College; Catholic University of Louvain 
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